Tag: analiza

Analysis of Emotet v4

Date of publication: 24/05/2017, Paweł Srokosz

Introduction

Emotet is a modular Trojan horse, which was firstly noticed in June 2014 by Trend Micro. This malware is related to other types like Geodo, Bugat or Dridex, which are attributed by researches to the same family.

Emotet was discovered as an advanced banker – it’s first campaign targeted clients of German and Austrian banks. Victims’ bank accounts were infiltrated by a web browser infection which intercept communication between webpage and bank servers. In such scenario, malware hooks specific routines to sniff network activity and steal information. This technique is typical for modern banking malware and is widely known as Man-in-the-Browser attack.

Next, modified release of Emotet banker (v2) has taken advantage of another technique – automation of stealing money from hijacked bank accounts using ATSs (Automated Transfer Systems, more informations on page 20 of CERT Polska Report 2013). This technology is also used in other bankers. Good examples are ISFB (Gozi) or Tinba.

At the beginning of April 2017, we observed wide malspam campaign in Poland, distributing fraudulent mails. E-mails were imitating delivery notifications from DHL logistics company and contained malicious link, which referred to brand-new, unknown variant of Emotet.

Malware distributed in this campaign differed from previously known versions. Behavior and communication methods were similar, but malware used different encryption and we noticed significant changes in its code. Thus we called this modification version 4.

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Talking to Dridex (part 0) – inside the dropper

Date of publication: 10/11/2015, CERT Polska

Intro

Dridex mostly comes to us as spam which contains a .doc with some macros, responsible for downloading a dropper. One can quickly analyze it using oledump.py and looking through vbscript, or naturally, just try to run it in a sandbox and obtain the dropped files.
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Smoke Loader poses as an Office plugin

Date of publication: 27/08/2015, Łukasz Siewierski

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Zaufana Trzecia Strona – a Polish security news portal – informed about a new attack on Polish user’s (link is in Polish) that used a Microsoft Office plugin install wizard as a decoy. In reality, the user not only installed the plugin, but also a malware called Smoke Loader. It allows the attacker to gather information about the infected machine and, among other things, redirect its DNS queries. We wrote an article about that malware, when we were informing about the infected sites in the gov.pl domain. Here we describe some features of Smoke Loader that seem new to us.
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Banatrix – an indepth look

Date of publication: 15/12/2014, CERT Polska

PL_malwareOf all of the Polish malware families that we have seen last year, Banatrix seems to be the most technologically advanced one. This malware was used to replace the bank account number in the browser memory, however its implementation allowed an attacker to execute any arbitrary code on the victim’s machine. This was used to extract passwords saved in the Mozilla Firefox browser. On this article we discuss the Banatrix C&C infrastructure and its use of TOR network both to hide the attacker’s identity and to make the botnet takedown a challenge.
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Ransomware still a threat to Polish users

Date of publication: 19/09/2013, CERT Polska

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During the summer holidays we observed an increased infection rate of ransomware. We mentioned this type of malware a few times already in the past (here is a description of similar malware and here is information detailing how to remove it from your computer). CERT Polska was able to acquire three samples of this malware from three different sources. In every case we were able to determine the infection vector. Most probably, all of the three samples were created by the same group of cybercriminals. One of the samples came from a hacked .gov.pl website in collaboration with CERT.GOV.PL, second sample was from a hacked website in .eu domain and the last sample was from a malicious advertisement from a .pl website. A case of malware on the governmental website was also a subject of our previous blog post.
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ZeuS-P2P internals – understanding the mechanics: a technical report

Date of publication: 07/06/2013, CERT Polska

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At the beginning of 2012, we wrote about the emergence of a new version of ZeuS called ZeuS-P2P or Gameover. It utilizes a P2P (Peer-to-Peer) network topology to communicate with a hidden C&C center.This malware is still active and it has been monitored and investigated by CERT Polska for more than a year. In the second half of 2012, it directly affected the Polish users, namely that of internet banking.
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Malware campaign on Polish governmental site

Date of publication: 20/05/2013, CERT Polska

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CERT Polska and CERT.GOV.PL recently discovered a website in the gov.pl domain that has been a part of malware campaign at least since the beginning of May 2013. The page contained a JavaScript code that added a hidden iframe which redirected to the exploit kit. Next, with the help of “Smoke Loader”, two binaries containing malware were downloaded. The first binary was a FakeAV software, which forced the user to buy a “full version” with the promise that it will remove all of the imaginary problems with her machine. The second binary contained a Kryptik trojan, which steals information from a large variety of FTP, SSH and WWW clients. It also steals SSL certificates used to sign code and performs a dictionary attack on the current logged user account. Both of them contain various techniques which are meant to prevent disassembly and debugging.
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CERT Polska Semiannual Report: January-June 2011

Date of publication: 21/10/2011, CERT Polska

CERT Polska

Our first semiannual report, covering period from January to June 2011 is focused on information from automated systems. We have received almost 4 million automated incident reports and we grouped them in major categories such as spam sources, phishing, malware, bots or DDoS attacks. We discuss our findings in the context of the 2010 annual report, indicating some important changes (some of which we are not able to fully explain). Some noteworthy observations are in the area of malware distribution and phishing in Polish networks, as well as spam sources and bots location. Among other discussions, we try to pinpoint some factors that break the apparently obvious correlation between the last two indicators. You can download the report in English from the following URL: http://www.cert.pl/PDF/Report_CP_1H2011.pdf

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